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I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no other litigation area has been the subject of as much interest
in reform as has medical malpractice. A distinct element of this interest
has centered on efforts to change the process by which malpractice cases
are handled. Since the mid-1970's, virtually every state has attempted
some type of "tort reform" intended to impact the manner in which medical
malpractice suits are handled.' In light of the incredible growth in the use
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1. For discussions of malpractice reform efforts including descriptions of procedural
changes, see U.S. GEm. Accr. OFF., MEDICAL MALPRACrICE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACrION
(1987) [hereinafter FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION]; PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
ON TRIAL (1991); Glen 0. Robinson, The Medical Malpractice Crisis of the 1970's: A
Retrospective, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 5; Walter J. Wadlington, Legal
Responses to Patient Injury: A Future Agenda for Research and Reform, 54 LAW &
CONMrEP. PROBS., Spring 1991, at 199.
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of alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") methods in the past decade,2 it
is inevitable that policy-makers will become interested in exploring how
the myriad ADR techniques might be best employed in the malpractice
context. This comment will examine actual and potential applications of
ADR approaches for handling medical malpractice disputes, focusing
particularly on ADR strategies for Alaska.
IL CONCEPTUALIZING THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF ADR:
UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT SYSTEM
An initial task is to describe ADR's potential benefits in the
malpractice context. This requires an understanding of the current
litigation frameworlk. Ilustration 1 (Appendix A) depicts a simplified time
line showing how a typical malpractice claim is processed through the
current system. The "X" indicates the point of the alleged malpractice.
Malpractice suits are typically not filed until at least one or two years after
the alleged negligence. Relatively little is known about why some potential
plaintiffs decide to assert a malpractice claim while others elect to do
nothing? No doubt the decision involves several factors, such as the
sophistication of the patient, the patient's access to legal information, and
the seriousness of the patient's injury.4
Malpractice claimants usually must resort to filing a formal lawsuit if
they are to obtain compensation. While there is some pre-itigation
settlement of malpractice claims, it is rare; most claimants who obtain any
compensation do so only after filing a lawsuit.5 Once a lawsuit is filed,
the litigation system has three primary phases, each of which is shown in
Illustration 1: (1) the pleading stage, which defines the parties' claims and
defenses; (2) the discovery stage, during which the litigants investigate the
facts surrounding their dispute; 6 and (3) the trial stage, in which the
2. For a general overview of ADR techniques and discussion of issues relating to theirdevelopment, set STEPEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUrION (2d ed. 1992).
3. Recent evidence shows that most patients with potential malpractice claims - those
patients who have suffered an iatrogenic injury attributable to a physician's negligence -
do not assert any claim. See HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS,
AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LiTIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION
IN NEW YORK (1990).
4. See generally Marlynn L. May & Daniel B. Stengel, Who Sues their Doctors? How
Patients Haidle Medical Grievances, 24 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 105 (1990).
5. See JAMES S. KAKAiK & NICHoLAS M. PACE, CoSTS AND COMPENSATION PAID
IN TORT LITIGATION 31 (1986) (noting that approximately 90% of the dollars paid to
claimants occurred after a lawsuit was filed). In comparison, only about 33% of the dollars
awarded to automobile accident claimants required a lawsuit; the balance was paid in
settlements reached without the need to resort to a lawsuit. Id.
6. Rules of procedure permit both parties full access to all relevant information
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dispute is resolved by the jury. In addition, for those cases that run the
course of the procedural gauntlet, the system provides an appeal process.
While one can articulate the goals of the procedural system in various
ways, the following seem paramount, at least in the context of medical
malpractice disputes: (1) to identify and dismiss non-meritorious litigation;
(2) to provide a framework in which voluntary settlement negotiations can
operate; and (3) to provide a dispute resolution process (the jury) for
resolving non-settled claims.7
A. Identifying Non-Meritorious Litigation
It is well known that the vast majority of malpractice cases (upwards
of ninety percent) are resolved prior to trial. In fact, this high percentage
of settlements combines two very different phenomena: (1) plaintiffs
dismissing their suits without receipt of any payment; and (2) settlements
in which the plaintiff receives a monetary indemnity. The former category
potentially includes a large number of non-meritorious claims that arguably
should not have been filed in the first place. One of the major criticisms
of malpractice litigation is that it permits, or even fosters, such claims.
Existing empirical evidence suggests that a significant percentage of
filed malpractice claims are eventually dismissed or dropped without
payment to the plaintiff.8 To some observers, this suggests that those
claims were lacking in merit and should never have been filed. While this
is not necessarily true, it does raise serious concerns as to whether there are
too many "frivolous" malpractice cases. The procedural device known as
summary judgment is intended to discourage non-meritorious litigation by
giving the courts the opportunity to dismiss such claims. Although there
relating to a claim. This investigatory process includes several different methods of
obtaining information, including requests for relevant documents (such as medical records);
interrogatories (written questions of the opposing party); and depositions (in which the
parties, relevant witnesses, and experts respond to oral questions asked by the attorneys).
7. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Researching Litigation: The Medical Malpractice
Example, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1988, at 199, 202 [hereinafter Metzloff,
Researching Litigation].
8. The extent of "frivolous" malpractice litigation is a sharply contested point. The
best current empirical evidence suggests that the percentage of non-meritorious malpractice
claims is substantial, probably near the 40% level. See Frederick W. Cheney et a].,
Standard of Care and Anesthesia Liability, 261 JAMA 1599 (1989). Cheney's study
involved expert review of over 1,000 case files to determine whether inadequate medical
care was in fact rendered. The study found that 46% of the claims involved appropriate
care (and thus were technically "non-meritorious" claims). The majority of the plaintiffs
in those cases received no compensation, although about 40% did receive some amount.
However, the amount received was usually far less than for those plaintiffs with similar
injuries who were victims of inadequate care. Id.; see generally Henry S. Farber &
Michelle I White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation
Process, 22 RAND . ECON. 199 (1991) (finding that 95 of 252 claims against a hospital
involved "appropriate" care).
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has been no empirical study directed towards the use of summary judgment
in malpractice cases, the conventional wisdom is that summary judgment
is ineffective.9 Medical professionals concerned with plaintiffs bringing
seemingly non-meritorious malpractice claims also have made repeated
efforts to seek sanctions or damages against plaintiffs' attorneys. 0 These
efforts, however, also have proven largely unsuccessful.
B. Settlement of Malpractice Litigation
To date, there has been no comprehensive analysis of the settlement
process in malpractice cases either with respect to when settlements
typically occur in the course of the litigation or with respect to the exact
factors which determine whether a settlement will occur at all." It is
clear, however, that settlements are common in malpractice cases. On
average, about fifty percent of all malpractice lawsuits are settled with the
plaintiff receiving a payment.12 Critics of the system suggest that the high
cost of malpractice litigation and the unpredictability of the results (1) force
patients to settle claims for significantly less than the true value of their
claims, 3 and (2) force physicians to settle claims in which they have
meritorious defenses. 4
In the past, most malpractice insurance contracts provided that the
physician had to consent to settlement prior to the insurer agreeing to a
compromise of the claim.' s Now, however, the majority of malpractice
insurers probably have the right to settle without the physician's consent.
As a practical matter, insurers remain interested in complying with a
physician's preference with respect to settlement. The prevailing view is
9. See generally Edward Brunet, The Use and Misuse of Expert Testimony in Summary
Judgment, 22 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 93 (1988).
10. See generally Sheila L. Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack: Liability of LawyersforInstituting UnjustifiedMedicalMalpractice Actions, 45 FoRDHAML. RE V. 1003 (1977).
11. Cf. Metloff, Researching Litigation, supra note 7, at 199. Among the factors that
malpractice insurers likely consider in deciding whether to settle are (1) the merits of the
case; (2) the risk of a large damages award should the jury find in favor of the plaintiff; (3)
the wishes of the defendant physician as to whether or not to settle; (4) the costs of
proceeding to trial; (5) the quality of the plaintiffs' attorney; (5) the sympathetic qualities
of the plaintiff; and (6) any unusual facts in the case (such as missing medical records) that
might influence a jury. Some malpractice insurers may give some of these factors relatively
more weight than other insurers. Id.
12. See generally U.S. GEN. Accr. OFF., MEDIcAL MALPRACIE: CHARACTERISTIcs
OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984 (1987) [hereinafter CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984].
13. WEILER, supra note 1, at 53-54.
14. See, e.g., WALTER K. OLSON, THE LTIGAnON EXPxSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr 267-68 (1991) (arguing that the merits of the case
constitute but a minor ingredient in explaining malpractice case results).
15. See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319, 361 (1991).
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that most physicians prefer to litigate to protect their reputation (and to
avoid any adverse consequences with disciplinary authorities). 6
Illustration 1 depicts the existing settlement system as a parallel process
co-existing with the ongoing formal court procedures. Under the current
regime, litigants are free to consider settlement whenever they so choose.
Despite this autonomy, there are a number of predictable "settlement
points" (shown by the arrows on the settlement line in Illustration 1).
These common settlement points include: (1) the pre-litigation period, (as
noted above, settlements are rare during this period in the malpractice
context); (2) the summary judgment stage; (3) the period immediately
preceding trial ("on the courthouse steps'); (4) the trial itself; and (5) the
appeal stage. The largest number of settlements appear to occur
immediately before trial, often after the parties have incurred sizable
litigation expenses.' 7 Under traditional rules of civil procedure, there are
no formal procedural events that require the parties to assess settlement of
their claim immediately preceding trial. However, many courts have the
power to raise the settlement issue during a pre-trial conference.'
C. The Role of the Jury in Malpractice Cases
One of the most frequent complaints about malpractice litigation is that
the jury is an untrustworthy decision-maker.
In fact, the jury resolves only a small percentage (about ten percent) of
malpractice cases, with the balance either being dropped by the plaintiff or
settled.'
16. See Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1172-73 (1990).
It is now widely speculated that settlement of malpractice cases will become more
difficult. In 1990, the federal government began requiring all malpractice insurers to report
any malpractice judgment or settlement to a data bank. Hospitals and other interested
parties will have the right to search the data bank to determine a physician's history with
respect to successful malpractice claims. This process raises serious concerns on the part
of physicians as to the possibility that even a single malpractice settlement might impact
their future ability to obtain hospital privileges and the like. See Ilene D. Johnson, Reports
to the National Practitioner Data Bank, 265 JAMA 407 (1991).
17. For some quantification of the timing of settlements in malpractice cases, see
Thomas B. Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imaging the Jury s Shadow, 54 LAW
& Co NrEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 43,59 n.54 [hereinafter Metzloff, Resolving Disputes]
(noting that about 25% of all malpractice suits in a three-year survey of North Carolina
cases were settled immediately preceding a scheduled trial).
18. See FED. R. Crv. P. 16 (noting that one purpose of pre-trial conferences is to
consider prospects for settlement). There is an abundant literature on judicial involvement
in the settlement process. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV.
376 (1982); American Law Institute Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation,
Alternatives, and Accommodation, 1989 DUKE L.. 811, 819-20. For a criticism of judicial
coercion of settlements, see Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073 (1984).
19. See generally Stephen Daniels & Lori Andrews, The Shadow of the Law: Jury
Decisions in Obstetrics and Gynecology Cases, in 2 MEDICAL PROFSSIONAL LIAB=1TY AND
THE DELIVERY OF OBSTETRICAL CARE 161 (Victoria P. Rostow & Roger J. Bulger eds.,
1992]
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The key issue is whether juries tend, as some observers suggest, to find
in favor of sympathetic plaintiffs regardless of the merits of the case.
Contrary to popular perception, most studies of malpractice trials have
shown that, more often than not, physicians prevail and juries are
reasonably competent decision-makers, at least with respect to the liability
issue. Despite the fact that physicians usually win, there is growing
concern with the number of large verdicts in favor of some plaintiffs.
There is a growing consensus, however, that one of the most serious
problems with malpractice juries is their lack of consistency in awarding
damages.' This raises several questions. First, do malpractice juries
award amounts comparable to awards for similar injuries in other litigation
contexts, such as automobile accident cases?' Second, are existing jury
awards sufficiently predictable to provide a "going rate" for settling other
malpractice disputes?'
1989).
The length of malpractice trials varies considerably; recent evidence suggests that the
median trial length is five days, but a significant number of much longer trials exist. See
Metzloff, Resolving Disputes, supra note 17, at 49-50.
20. Metzloff, Resolving Disputes, supra note 17, at 82-83. This fact by itself is not
determinative, however, as it is first necessary to know more about why some cases are tried
and others dropped or settled. Existing evidence strongly suggests that the trial selection
process is far from random. Instead, it is possible that due to insurer unwillingness to settle
non-meritorious malpractice cases, many weak plaintiffs' cases are tried, resulting in
numerous pro-defendant results.
21. See generally David J. Nye et al., The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis:
An Analysis of Claims Data and Insurance Company Finances, 76 GEO. U. 1495 (1988).
With respect to large jury verdicts, one must also consider the impact of possible post-
trial adjustments through various mechanisms such as appeal. Recent evidence suggests that
particularly large malpractice awards are often reduced, although the specific dynamics of
how these awards are challenged is not well understood. See Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics
of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final Disbursements, 11 JUST. SYS. 1. 349(1986); MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PTERSON, POST-TRIAL ADJUSTmN TO JURY
AWARDS 27 (1987). While post-trial reductions provide some solace, the evidence does not
indicate that the post-trial adjustment process serves as an efficient or reliable "quality
control" check on jury awards. Metzloff, Resolving Disputes, supra note 17, at 87-88;
WEMLER, supra note 1, at 48.
22. This criticism is not necessarily directed to juries per so, but can also be targeted
at the substantive law of damages which allows substantial discretion by the decision-maker
- be it judge or jury - on the appropriate amount to award.
23. See Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpractice and Other
Personal Injuries Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 5.
24. See, e.g., Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling
"Pain and Suffering," 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908 (1989). Recent empirical studies demonstrate
serious problems in predicting the amount of damages a jury may award, and that this factor
does indeed negatively impact the settlement process. See Metzloff, Resolving Disputes,
supra note 17, at 88-93.
A related concern involves the issue of punitive damages. While the evidence suggests
that punitive damages are rarely awarded in malpractice cases, this fact alone does not mean
that these concerns are insubstantial. Punitive damages are occasionally awarded against
hospitals, often in large amounts. Also, many malpractice plaintiffs, whether they prevail
on the claim or not, allege punitive damages, which contributes to the high level of concern
[Vol. 9:2
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III. THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF MALPRACTICE ADR
Numerous commentators have advocated the use of ADR in mal-
practice cases. 5 In general, the arguments favoring the use of ADR in
the malpractice context have been based on the six goals briefly outlined
below.
A. Use of a More Qualified Decision-Maker
Many ADR advocates have questioned the legitimacy of lay juries
deciding complex malpractice disputes and have looked to ADR to provide
a more qualified decision-maker. Often, specific methods -- such as the
screening panel procedures discussed below -- directly involve medical
professionals in the decision-making process. Other approaches rely on
using skilled lawyers with experience in resolving complex claims.
B. Reduction in Litigation Cost
Malpractice litigation is undoubtedly expensive. The best available
evidence indicates that the costs of litigating malpractice disputes exceed
the amount paid in compensation to injured plaintiffs. ADR is often
seen as a means to reduce those expenses.
C. Reducing the Trauma of Malpractice Litigation
Traditional malpractice litigation takes an emotional toll on the parties,
particularly the doctor accused of malpractice. Physicians perceive the suit
as an allegation of almost criminal misconduct; doctors often speak in
terms of innocence or guilt, despite the fact that a malpractice trial is not
a criminal proceedingY ADR methods mitigate this problem by being
exhibited by physician defendants. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth andReality
in Punitive Damages, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1990).
25. See, e.g., FRAMEWORK FOR ACION, supra note 1, at 30-31 (noting desirability of
evaluating ADR mechanisms for malpractice); Neil D. Schor, Note, Health Care Providers
and Alternative Dispute Resolution: Needed Medicine to Combat Medical Malpractice
Claims, 4 OIO ST. J. oN DiSP. RESOL. 65 (1988); Rhoda M. Powsner & Frances
Hamermesh, Medical Malpractice Crisis the Second Time Around: Why Not Arbitrate?, 8
I. LEGAL MEE). 283 (1987).
26. See Kakalik & Pace, supra note 5, at 41, 54 (noting that costs and expenses
incurred by malpractice plaintiffs constituted approximately 36% of the amount recovered,
while aggregate defense costs were approximately 30% of the amount awarded in
compensation). Certainly, the high costs are a partial function of the use of the jury as
decision-maker. See Metzloff, ResolvingDisputes, supra note 17, at 53-59 (discussing costs
associated with jury trials and noting that more than half of defense expenditures were
directly related to the trial stage of the case).
27. See F. Patrick Hubbard, The Physicians' Point of View Concerning Medical
Malpractice: A Sociological Perspective on the Symbolic Importance of "Tort Reform," 23
1992]
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more private and less lengthy, thus diminishing the time the physician must
spend away from her practice 28
D. Improving the Quality of Expert Witnesses
The medical profession and commentators frequently complain about
the low quality of experts who testify on behalf of plaintiffs.?9 In turn,
plaintiffs' attorneys note the difficulty in obtaining skilled experts who are
willing to testify against colleagues. Certainly, expert evidence plays a
crucial role hi malpractice litigation; in virtually every malpractice case,
both parties must have experts to testify as to the applicable standard of
care. A potential benefit of ADR is altering the method by which experts
are obtained, such as by requiring the use of court-appointed neutral
experts.
E. Handling the Small Case
Given the expense inherent in litigating a malpractice claim through to
trial, it is commonly perceived that experienced malpractice plaintiffs'
attorneys will only consider those claims involving serious injuries and
potentially large damage awards. Certainly, it is more difficult for
modestly injured patients to assert a malpractice claim. Accordingly, some
view ADR as a less onerous process that will facilitate the assertion of
these currently excluded claims.
F. Dealing with Frivolous Litigation
As noted above, many commentators are concerned with the apparently
high incidenoe of non-meritorious malpractice suits.3 One possible cause
of this problem is inadequate screening of potential malpractice claims.
Given the complexity of proving a malpractice case, very few plaintiffs can
pursue a claim successfully without the assistance of counsel. It is thus
widely recognized that plaintiffs' attorneys serve a critical gatekeeping
GA. L. REV. 295, 320-23 (1989); WELER, supra note 1, at 6-7.
28. The interest in privacy is by no means limited to malpractice defendants. Seriously
injured plaintiffs may prefer the less public setting of aR. For example, the Private
Adjudication Center at Duke University recently administered a malpractice arbitration in
a case in which the plaintiff was a five-year old child suffering from the after-effects of a
drug overdose. His parents did not want him to sit through a lengthy trial listening to
experts discuss the nature of his disabilities. The parties agreed that he need not be present
during the two-day arbitration and that no transcript of the proceedings be made.
29. See PETR W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGT: JUNK SCmNCE IN THE COURTROOM
75-91 (1991) (discussing the inconsistent quality of expert testimony in obstetrical
malpractice cases).
30. See supra part lIA.
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role. ' While in most states there is a small cadre of highly competent
malpractice attorneys who, as a practical matter, specialize, there are also
numerous attorneys with little or no malpractice experience who
occasionally accept malpractice cases. This may result in the filing of
marginal claims by inexperienced attorneys. Accordingly, some suggest
that ADR can provide an early review of the merits of the claim, thus
serving as an additional gatekeeping tool.
IV. ANALYZING SPECIFIC ADR OPTIONS FOR MALPRACTICE CASES
As discussed above, there are numerous litigation concerns in the
malpractice context which ADR is thought to address. Illustration 2
(Appendix B) presents the malpractice time line revised to indicate how
various ADR techniques would operate within the malpractice context.
Although the diagram is not exhaustive of all of the possible ADR methods
that might be applied to malpractice cases, it does identify those methods
that have already been applied to malpractice cases or those that are
conceptually well suited to such disputes.2 In general, each of the ADR
methods depicted in Illustration 2 establishes a new settlement point based
upon an additional type of input that the parties are to consider.
31. For a useful discussion of the role of plaintiffs' attorneys see Melvin W. Reder,
Contingent Fees in Litigation with Special Reference to Medical Malpractice, in THE
ECONOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTCE 211 (Simon Rottenberg ed., 1978).
32. An important ADR alternative not directly discussed in text is the American
Medical Association's ("AMA") bold and controversial administrative plan to transfer all
malpractice disputes from the courts to a specialized administrative tribunal. See AM. MED.
ASS'N/SpECIALTY SOCITY MEDICAL LAmBrY PROJECr, A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TO
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILrTY DisPurEs: A FAULT-
BASED, ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM (1988).
While retaining the general tort rules on negligence, the AMA proposal would employ
an elaborate procedural system involving an initial review and investigation by a claims
processor, referral to a neutral expert; assignment of a "court-appointed" attorney;
mandatory settlement offers; submission of the dispute to a hearing examiner, and review
of substantive decisions by an overseeing board. For a more complete description, see Kirk
B. Johnson et al., A Fault-Based Administrative Alternative for Resolving Medical
Malpractice Claims, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (1989).
While some commentators have expressed interest in the AMA's proposal, others have
been decidedly negative. Compare WEILER, supra note 1, at 117 (expressing support for
the "AMA's ingeniously designed proposal" which in his view "would likely fare quite well
in any open-minded comparison" with traditional litigation) with J. Douglas Peters, Critique
of the American Medical Association's Model Medical Liability and Practices Reform Act,
1 CTs., HEALTH Sa. & LAW 51 (1990). For an insightful examination of the proposal, see
Randall R. Bovbjerg, Reforming a Proposed Tort Reform: Improving on the American
Medical Association's Proposed Administrative Tribunal for Medical Malpractice, 1 Crs.,
HEALTH SCi. & LAW 19 (1990). The AMA had hoped that at least a few states would
adopt the model as an experiment; to date, none have done so.
1992]
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What follows is a brief description of each ADR process depicted in
Ilustration 2 and an overview of any experiences or empirical studies
relating to each method in the malpractice context.
A. Risk Management
Hospitals routinely employ risk management programs designed to
monitor and improve the quality of care. This is done primarily in an
effort to minimize iatrogenic injuries suffered by patients by identifying
particularly risky procedures.?3  Another aspect of risk management
activity is the prompt identification of any negligently inflicted injuries that
may occur. To date, however, most hospitals have not aggressively
pursued early identification and resolution of potential malpractice
claims.34 Accordingly, one available ADR strategy is for hospitals and
other health care professionals to become more directly involved in the
early recognition of disputes, before the patient decides to file a
malpractice claim. A more active stance could result in early resolution of
disputes, by placating angry patients before these disputes are transformed
into formal suits.3
B. Arbitration
In arbitration, the parties agree to use an arbitrator, usually a privately
retained individual, to render the decision in place of a judge or jury.
Thus, arbitration is both (1) a voluntary process, in that the parties have
agreed at some point to its use, and (2) a binding process that will
conclusively resolve the dispute. In addition, the parties have substantial
power to determine for themselves the particular details of the arbitration
procedure." As depicted in Illustration 2, parties can agree to arbitration
at several points. Thus, litigants in a malpractice case can voluntarily agree
to submit their claim to binding arbitration in lieu of a jury even after the
suit is filed.37
33. See generally Laura L. Morlock & Faye E. Malitz, Do HospitalRisk Management
Programs Make aDifference?:RelationshipsBetweenRiskManagementProgram Activities
and Hospital Malpractice Claims Experience, 54 LAw & CoNTmMP. PRoBS., Spring 1991,
at 1; AM. MED. Ass'N/S ECIALTY SOCiETY MEDICAL LAmBrY PRojEcr, RISK
MANAGEMENT PRNCmE & CoMMENrARIEs FOR THE MEDICAL OFFICE (1990).
34. For a discussion of the role of risk management in minimizing potential malpractice
claims or in improving the handling of such claims, see Orley H. Lindgren et al., Medical
Malpractice Risk Management Early Warning Systems, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1991, at 23.
35. Id. at 41.
36. Procedural variables relating to the conduct of an arbitration hearing include, among
others: (1) the length of the arbitration hearing; (2) the number of arbitrators; (3) the
required qualification of arbitrators; (4) the process for selecting arbitrators; (5) the amount
of discovery permitted to be conducted.
37. Far more problematic, however, is whether the physician and patient can enter into
[Vol. 9:2
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Currently, the use of arbitration varies widely among litigation
contexts, with some areas, such as securities litigation, dominated by
arbitration.3" Legislative action to facilitate the use of arbitration in
malpractice cases was an early tort reform agenda item. Approximately
fourteen states enacted specific legislation designed to promote malpractice
arbitration3 9 Arbitration does not yet play a critical role, however, in
resolving medical malpractice cases4° although its potential application
has been widely advocated.4'
Empirical research on arbitration's impact on malpractice cases is
sparse, primarily because so few malpractice cases have been submitted to
arbitration. The scant evidence that does exist suggests that the process is
not inherently pro-physician.42 For example, a recent study found that
plaintiffs prevailed slightly more often in arbitration than in traditional
litigation and that the process was less time-consuming.4 3
It is not clear why the use of arbitration has not been more prevalent
despite efforts to facilitate its use. Several explanations deserve
consideration. First, early judicial hostility to the use of arbitration in
a binding arbitration agreement prior to the rendition of the medical services.
38. See ShearsonAmerican Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(announcing public policy in favor of arbitration, including consumer disputes against
securities dealers); Cf. Gilmer v. InterstateJohnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991)
(upholding arbitration agreement in age discrimination suit).
39. For a useful review of state legislative efforts, see Irving Ladimer & Joel Solomon,
Medical Malpractice Arbitration: Laws, Programs, Cases, 653 INS. L. J. 335 (1977). The
failure of a state to enact a specific malpractice arbitration statute does not preclude the use
of arbitration; most states have enacted the Model Arbitration Act, which provides a basis
for claiming a right to enter into an arbitration agreement.
40. According to a 1984 study of malpractice claims closed in that year, only 0.2% of
malpractice claims were decided following arbitration. CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, supra note
12, table 2.20, at 37. See generally U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., MEDICAL MALmACTICE: FEW
CLAIMS RESOLVED THROUGH MtICHIGAN'S VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION PROGRAM 7 (1990)
[hereinafter MICHIGAN PROGRAM] (noting that legislation to encourage voluntary binding
arbitration produced only 247 actual arbitrations out of approximately 20,000 malpractice
claims in a 13 year period).
41. On the use of private contractual approaches such as arbitration to the malpractice
problem, see Symposium, Medical Malpractice: Can the Private Sector Find Relief?, 49
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 1.
42. See Irving Ladimer et al., Experience in Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 2 L
LEGAL MED. 433 (1981) (finding that arbitration tends to skew results in favor of plaintiffs
with severe permanent disabilities as compared to those claimants with minor injuries); see
generally Stephen Zuckerman et al., Information on Malpractice: A Review of Empirical
Research on Major Policy Issues, 49 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1986, at 85, 103-06
(summarizing available empirical information on arbitration results); Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial by Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L.
REV. 1124, table 3, at 1137 (1992) (finding that malpractice plaintiffs prevailed more often
in federal court cases tried by the judge than in cases tried to a jury).
43. See MICIRGAN PROGRAM, supra note 40, at 8 (noting that plaintiffs prevailed in
22,o of arbitrated cases as compared to 18% in traditional litigation). Surprisingly,
however, the GAO study found that the average cost to the litigants of resolving the cases
were comparable, not cheaper as had been expected. Id.
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malpractice cases created an obstacle.0 Second, many of the statutory
provisions ostensibly designed as consumer protection measures actually
serve to limit the use of arbitration agreements.45 Third, malpractice
attorneys, both on the plaintiff and defense side, generally are averse to
routine use of arbitration.4 6 The jury is often viewed by both plaintiff and
defense attorneys (and many insurers) as an appropriate "dispute resolver"
in many types of malpractice cases, such as those in which there is a
critical factual dispute. Fourth, some attorneys believe that arbitrators tend
to make compromise decisions that do not fully vindicate their clients'
interests. Particularly in the malpractice context, where physicians possess
a strong interest in vindicating their conduct, this perception of arbitrators
"splitting the baby" represents a potentially significant problem 7 Finally,
the lack of interest in arbitration on the part of malpractice insurers may
represent a concern that if a truly expedited process for asserting
malpractice claims were established, the number of malpractice claims
asserted would skyrocket.
C. Mediation
Mediation is one of the most overused but misunderstood terms in the
ADR lexicon. Although not susceptible to strict definition, mediation is
generally a dispute resolution process in which the litigants themselves
(and usually their attorneys) meet with an impartial, disinterested mediator
in an attempt to settle the case.48 The mediator's role is primarily to
facilitate the parties' understanding of the nature of the dispute and to
explore practical solutions, even if those solutions are not necessarily
required by applicable substantive law principles. Mediation is thought to
be particularly well suited to disputants with a longstanding past
44. See, e.g., Obstetrics & Gynecologists Ltd. v. Pepper, 693 P.2d 1259 (Nev. 1985);
Roberts v. McNivnara-Warren Community Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 279 (Mich. Ct. A pp. 1984).
See generally Mary Bedikian, Medical Malpractice Arbitration Act: Michigan's Experience
with Arbitration, 10 AM. LL. & MED. 287 (1984) (reviewing early case law under Michigan
arbitration statute).
45. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-9-61 (Supp. 1992) (permitting patient to agree to
arbitration only after alleged act of physician negligence has occurred and after consulting
with an attorney).
46. See Nicolas P. Terry, The Technical and Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice
Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U. LJ. 571, 574-75 (1986) (suggesting that "for conceptual and
technical reasons, malpractice arbitration as currently envisaged is a dangerously
inappropriate solution to the real or perceived malpractice crisis").
47. See PHYSICIAN INSURERS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, A COMPREmNSIVE REVIEW
OF ALTERNATIVES TO TBE PRESENr SYSTEM OF RESOLVING MEDICAL LIABILrrY CLAIMS
49 (1989) (discussing possible disadvantages to arbitration, including the concern with
compromise results).
48. See generally Lon L. Fuller, Mediation - Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 305 (1971).
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relationship who desire or otherwise need to maintain a working, if not
necessarily cordial, future relationship.
Experience with the use of traditional mediation in malpractice cases
is very limited.4 9 For several years, Wisconsin has unsuccessfully
employed a hybrid procedure that is ostensibly labelled as a mediation
process.50 More recently, a few states have enacted legislation
empowering trial court judges to mandate the use of mediation in any civil
dispute, including malpractice cases!' While these programs were not
specifically designed for malpractice cases, judges have routinely referred
malpractice cases to mediation under these programs. To date, however,
there are no empirical evaluations of the results of these hybrid ADR
processes in the malpractice context.
D. Screening Panels
In the mid-1970's, a number of states adopted special litigation
procedures for malpractice cases. Commonly called "pre-trial screening
panels," these early ADR examples usually required plaintiffs to submit
their claims to a special panel (often composed of a physician, attorney,
and lay member). The panel would consider the parties' respective
positions and issue a non-binding decision. In theory, a panel finding of
no liability would induce the plaintiff to drop the claim; a finding of
liability would provide an impetus to defendants to settle. In any event,
either party could insist upon trial by jury, although some states made the
panel's finding admissible at the subsequent trial5 2 Recently, several
states have abolished their screening panel procedures.5 3
49. Professor Leonard L. Riskin at the University of Missouri-Columbia has attempted
to apply traditional mediation techniques to malpractice cases, but the project has been
limited by the paucity of cases voluntarily referred to this process. See LEONARD L. RISIN,
CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF DisPurE RESOLUTION, FINAL REPORT TO THE NATIONAL
INSTIIUTE FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION ON INNOVATION FUND GRANT FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE MEDIATION 7-8 (1992) (on file with author). There are sporadic reports of
successful mediations in individual malpractice cases. See, e.g., Hank De Zutter,
Proponents Say ADR Spells Relief, ILL. LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 1988, at 1 (describing successful
mediation of a malpractice case).
50. See Catherine S. Meschievitz, Mediation and Medical Malpractice: Problems with
Definition and Implementation, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1991, at 195 (noting
several problems relating to a hybrid mediation process in Wisconsin). In fact, the
Wisconsin process is probably more aptly described as a variant on the screening-panel
model rather than a mediation procedure given the lack of mediation training among the
panel members and the lack of discussion among the disputants. Id. at 211-12; see infra
part IV.D.
51. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 44.1011-106 (West Supp. 1992).
52. For a comprehensive overview of the screening panel procedures, see Jean A.
Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model Legislation to Cure
Judicial Ills, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 181 (1990).
53. See, e.g., Debra L. Fortenberry, Note, Screening Panels: Corrective Surgery or
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The most common criticism of the panels is that they are
administratively cumbersome and that they sometimes lead to long
delays. "' Other concerns are that the process may come too early in the
evolution of the claim before the parties have conducted sufficient
investigation. Other commentators continue to express support for this
ADR approach.-1 Existing empirical studies are generally mixed, with
some indications that screening panels do indeed screen out low-merit
cases, but perhaps only because more claimants elect to assert a claim
before the panels.5 6
E. Early Neutral Evaluation and Court-Ordered Arbitration
One rapidly growing area in the ADR field is the development of
court-sponsored ADR programs. Concerned with burgeoning dockets,
numerous state and federal courts have initiated mandatory, but non-
binding, ADR processes. Two of these initiatives are potentially well
suited to malpractice.
Early neutral evaluation (Number 5 in Illustration 2) calls for the early
assessment of the case by an experienced neutral attorney on the basis of
brief presentations by the parties.7 Ordinarily, the evaluator is a skilled
litigator with experience in the particular type of case in dispute. The
theory is that the parties will benefit by the evaluator's neutral assessment
of the value of the case and therefore reconsider their positions. If the case
does not settle, the evaluation is usually kept confidential5 8 As shown,
this ADR intervention occurs relatively early in the dispute, after the
parties have had some time to conduct discovery on key issues, but before
Amputation, 4 J. Dis,. RES. 255,259-62 (1989) (discussing repeal of Ohio screening panel);
Jona Goldschmidt, Where Have All the Panels Gone?: A History of the Arizona Medical
Liability Review Panel, 23 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1013 (1992).
54. See, e.g., WEILER, supra note 1, at 42 (suggesting that screening panels are "fraught
with difficulty" and describing several practical problems with screening panels including
delay and imposition of additional expense).
55. See Macchiaroli, supra note 52, at 239-49.
56. Useful empirical studies include J. MARDFMN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN THE STATE
OF HAWAII (1986) (discussing experiences with Hawaii screening panel system); Stephen
Shmanske & Tina Stevens, The Performance of Medical Malpractice Review Panels, 11 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 525 (1986).
For an in-depth discussion of Alaska's medical malpractice advisory panel, see supra
Jonathan S. Aronae, Note, Alaska's Medical Malpractice Expert advisory Panel: Assessing
the Prognosis, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 401 (1992).
57. See Wayne D. Brazil, A Close Look at Three Court Sponsored ADR Programs: Why
They Exist, How They Operate, What They Deliver, and Whether They Threaten Important
Values, 1990 U. CH. LEGAL F. 303, 334-35. Brazil explains that a typical case presentation
is perhaps 15 minutes in length and entails an explanation of the parties' legal theories as
well as short description of the evidence that supports each theory. Id. at 335.
58. A secondary goal is for the evaluator to assist the parties in focusing discovery
should the case not settle. Id. at 336-37.
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the bulk of expenditures have been made. To date, formal early-neutral
evaluation programs have been limited to the federal courts. Because
malpractice cases most often arise in state courts, there is no evidence as
to how well this model would work in the malpractice context 9
Court-ordered arbitration (Number 6 in Illustration 2) is a process in
which certain disputes are channelled to a non-binding arbitration process
following the completion of designated period of discovery. As with the
other ADR methods, the details of how specific programs operate varies
substantially?6 This particular ADR method originated in the state courts
in the mid-1950's and was targeted at minor disputes. After a period of
slow or no growth in the use of this process, a wave of states adopted
court-ordered arbitration programs during the 1980'S.61 The federal court
followed suit with the initiation of experimental arbitration programs.62
While programs vary, the following example presents a typical
approach, based upon the program in effect in the Middle District of North
Carolina.6 3 After suit is filed and the case is determined eligible for the
ADR program, the parties are given three months to conduct discovery.
The parties are urged to agree upon the selection of a single arbitrator from
a list of experienced attorneys prepared by the court.6 If they are unable
to agree, one is appointed for them. The arbitrator is paid by the court at
the maximum rate of $500 per case. The rules anticipate a pre-hearing
exchange of information relating to such factors as the identity of witnesses
who will testify at the hearing and the documents that will be produced.
The rules do not establish a maximum length for the hearing, but on
average the hearings last approximately seven hours.65 The arbitrator
must issue an award within fifteen days of the hearing. Following the
decision, either party may request a trial de novo; however, before
59. Early neutral evaluation was pioneered in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California. For a brief history of the development of the early neutral
evaluation model in that court, see David J. Levine, Northern District of California Adopts
Early Neutral Evaluation to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 72 JUDICATURE 235 (1989).
60. For an excellent overview of characteristics and performance in federal court-
ordered arbitration programs, see BARBARA S. MEMRHOEFER, FED. JUD. CENTER, COURT-
ANNEXED ARBrrRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (1990).
61. On the history of the growth in state court programs, see Susan Keilitz et al., State
Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 STATE CT. J., Spring 1988, at 4.
62. See Paul Nejelski & Andrew S. Zeldin, Court Annexed Arbitration in the Federal
Courts: The Philadelphia Story, 42 MD. L. REV. 787 (1983).
63. E. ALLAN LIND, ARBITRATING HIGH-STAiEs CASES: AN EVALUATION OF COURT-
ANNEXED ARBrRATION IN A UNITED STATES DismTR COURT (1990) (containing copy of
the local rules controlling the North Carolina federal court's court-ordered arbitration
program).
64. The rules require that the arbitrator have been a member of the state bar for at least
eight years and be determined by the court to be competent to perform the duties of an
arbitrator. Id. at 77.
65. Id. at 30-31.
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proceeding with a conventional trial, the parties must confer with the
arbitrator to discuss his or her assessments of the case in an effort to
achieve a settlement.66 If the case proceeds to trial, no evidence relating
to the court-ordered arbitration results is admissible.'
To date, few malpractice cases have been subjected to court-ordered
arbitration. In state courts, programs typically have a jurisdictional cap
providing that only cases involving less than a certain amount in
controversy (such as $25,000) go through the process. At thejurisdictional
amount levels commonly in effect, virtually no malpractice cases are
eligible. The federal court programs, however, target higher value cases
(up to $150,000 in the Middle District of North Carolina) and, as a result,
some malpractice cases have been covered. 68
In contrast to many of the other ADR programs described in this
comment, court-ordered arbitration programs have been subjected to
intensive empirical scrutiny. The results of the studies vary in their
analysis of the programs' effectiveness. In general, the evidence supports
the view that litigants are well satisfied with court-ordered arbitration and
that the process does result in more expeditious resolution of claims.69 Of
course, a key element in determining the success of a program is how well
the program is administered at the state level.70
F. The Summary Jury Trial and Its Variations
The summary jury trial ("SJT') is a relatively new ADR process, first
used in 1980 by a federal judge in Ohio.7' To date, it has been used
regularly only in scattered federal district courts, although several state
66. Id. at 84.
67. Id.
68. Metzloff, Researching Litigation, supra note 7, at 225 n.82.
69. See, e.g., Stevens H. Clarke et al., Court-Ordered Arbitration in North Carolina:
Case Outcomes and Litigant Satisfaction, 14 JUST. SYs. . 154 (1991) (discussing results
of study using random assignment of cases which indicated high levels of party satisfaction
and reduced case disposition times for North Carolina state court program); E. ALLAN LM
ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF JusICu: TORT LrIGANrS' ViEws OF TRIAL, CouRT-ANNExED
ARBITRATION, mrD JUDICIAL SETILEMENr CONFERENCES (1989); Lind, supra note 63,(evaluating performance of court-ordered arbitration program for the federal district court
for the Middle District of North Carolina); see generally Deborah R. Hensler, What We
Know and Don't Know About Court-Administered Arbitration, 69 JUDICAlURE 270 (1986).
70. Clarke, supra note 69, at 181-82 (noting that the North Carolina state court program
was planned and managed with great care" and that a different program "lacking this kind
of planning and management might not work as well").
71. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lambros, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New
Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PIT. L. REv. 789, 798-804 (1989); D. MARIMPROVIE, Fn. JuD. CENTER, SETrLEMENr STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL Disrucr JUDGES 68-
76 (1986). For an interesting critique of the SJT process, see Joan K. Archer Rowland,
Comment, Communication and Psychology Variables: Reasons to Reject the Summary Jury
Trial as an Alternate Dispute Resolution Technique, 39 KAN. L. REV. 1071 (1991).
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courts have recently begun experimenting with the process. Because of its
federal court origins, only a few malpractice cases (which are usually filed
in state courts) have been subjected to SJTsZ The process is usually
voluntary, although a few judges have attempted to require party
participation.!3
The theory of the SJT is that in cases headed for a lengthy trial, the
parties would benefit by having a summary or preview of the case
presented to a jury for an advisory verdict. The presentation would be
greatly expedited compared to a normal trial; cases that might take several
weeks to try in a traditional fashion would be presented in the SJT setting
in a day. This efficiency is achieved by taking various shortcuts, most
notably having the lawyers summarize the evidence in lieu of witness
testimony. In theory, the summary jury's verdict will aid the parties in
reaching a voluntary settlement.
Evidence of the SJT's efficacy is mixed! 4 Researchers have had
difficulty designing empirically sound studies of the process primarily
because its voluntary nature precludes the use of random assignment of
cases to control groups to create valid comparative studies.75
While proponents of the SyT generally claim that the process is well
suited to personal injury suits such as medical malpractice, there are, in
fact, serious reasons to question its application.76 Some malpractice cases
turn on factual issues that are better resolved after the jury has had a full
opportunity to assess witness credibility. Other cases turn on complex
expert evidence that is not easily or fairly summarized in so brief a fashion.
Other malpractice cases are tried conventionally in only a few days and are
thus not good candidates for the SJT process, which is usually targeted at
cases that require a week or more to litigate. While on a case-by-case basis
the SJT might be suitable for particular malpractice disputes, it is unlikely
that it represents a plausible alternative in the majority of malpractice
actions.
72. For one of the few malpractice cases that is reported to have used the process, see
Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D. Ky. 1987).
73. The Seventh Circuit has held that federal district courts cannot mandate the use of
summary jury trials. Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884 (7th Cir. 1988). Numerous
district courts in other circuits, however, have held that they have such power. See, e.g.,
McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43 (E.D. Ky. 1988).
74. For existing studies, see M. DANIEL JAcouBovrrCH & CARL M. MOORE, FED. JUD.
CENTER, SUMMARY JURY TRIALS IN TH-E NORTHERN DISTcr OF OHIO (1982); James J.
Alfini, Summary Jury Trials in State and Federal Courts: A Comparative Analysis of the
Perceptions of Participating Lawyers, 4 OHIO ST. I. ON DISP. RESOL 213 (1989)
(describing research study of state and federal court SIT programs in Florida).
75. See Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative
Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CQ. L. REv. 366,374-75 (1986).
76. See Thomas B. Metzloff, Reconfiguring the Summary Jury Trial, 41 DUKE LJ. 806,
841-50 (1992) [hereinafter Metzloff, Summary Jury Trial].
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There also exists a-potentially important variation on the SJT, which
utilizes some of its techniques in a binding procedure, which is referred to
in Illustration 2 as a "jury-determined settlement"77 In this process, the
litigants agree to a shortened trial usually after negotiating an agreement
that specifies the range within which the parties are willing to settle. The
summary jury's decision determines the precise amount of the settlement
within the confines of the parties' "high/low" agreement. To date, several
large malpractice cases have utilized this hybrid process in North Carolina
where the state court rules are expressly designed to facilitate binding
SJTs. 8 Because the parties must agree on the settlement parameters, this
process is necessarily voluntary and cannot be mandated by a court. It is
essentially an ADR process to limit the parties' litigation risk both by
setting appropriate limits on the result (in lieu of the unpredictable jury
process) and by lowering litigation expenses.
V. DETERMINING A MALPRACTICE ADR STRATEGY FOR ALASKA
Having canvassed several potential ADR choices, the final matter is to
develop a strategy as to which specific ADR initiatives should be pursued
and in what fashion. For several reasons, this is not a simple task. First,
it is clear that ADR program performance is a function not just of the type
of process used but of how it is administered. Accordingly, the manner in
which a program is implemented may be as important as which process is
chosen; certainly, administration issues must be carefully attended to during
the planning process. Also, many ADR methods have not been directly
applied to complex litigation such as malpractice disputes, and thus there
is little or no empirical evidence as to how those processes will work
within that context. 9
In developing an informed ADR strategy for a particular litigation
context, it is necessary to establish desired criteria. This comment offers
five goals for a malpractice ADR system, as well as four ADR strategies
that achieve such goals."
77. Id. at 850-65.
78. Id. at 852-53. For a description of some of the North Carolina cases, see THOMAS
B. METZLOFF ET AL., SUMMARY JURIES IN THE NORTH CAROLNA STATE COURT SYSTEM
19-28 (1991).
79. See generally Edward Brunet Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute
Resolution, 62 TOL. L. REv. 1 (1987).
80. Even a cursory examination of attributes of some of the existing ADR options
suggests that they are not appropriate ADR solutions for the bulk of malpractice disputes.
For example, the summary jury trial does not appear well suited to accomplishing these
goals. By continuing to employ a jury, the SJT does not address the concern of having a
skilled decision-maker or the problem of inconsistency in awarding damages. Second, by
occurring so late in the process (usually in the period immediately preceding trial), it does
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A. The Goals of a Malpractice ADR System
1. A Malpractice ADR System Should Be Designed to Produce
Decisions on the Merits, Not to Promote Compromise Settlements.
Because of state and federal requirements to report all malpractice
settlements for disciplinary and reporting purposes, no system that tries to
coerce nuisance value settlements is likely to achieve general acceptance
among malpractice insurers or physicians.
2. A Malpractice ADR System Should Be Focused in Part upon Early
Identification of Non-Meritorious Claims. There is substantial evidence
regarding the high frequency of weak or non-meritorious claims in the
malpractice context. Accordingly, an ADR system must be cognizant of
the medical profession's interest in minimizing the expense and disruptive
impact caused by the assertion of marginal claims.
3. A Malpractice ADR System Should Utilize Decision-Makers Skilled
in Understanding Complex Medical Evidence Within the Existing Legal
Framework for Assessing Liability and Awarding Damages. Malpractice
cases regularly involve complex medical issues relating to both the
standard of care and causation. Accordingly, an ADR system should
provide decision-makers who are knowledgeable in the types of medical
issues that may arise. This does not necessarily mean that the system must
employ physicians in the role of decision-makers. The negligence standard
to be applied involves the application of both legal and medical elements.
Thus, experienced attorneys may be well suited for this role.
4. A Malpractice ADR System Should Be Designed to Promote
Consistency in the Award of Damages. Strong evidence demonstrates the
inconsistency in malpractice damage awards."' Absent substantive law
changes to address the problems noted, an ADR system must make a
concerted effort to apply the existing law of damages in as rational a
manner as possible. This would serve the goals of both equity and
predictability.
not offer significant cost reductions. See Metzloff, Summary Jury Trial, supra note 76, at
843-44 (discussing the lack of potential for meaningful cost savings associated with the use
of summary jury trials in malpractice cases). This does not mean that the ST is necessarily
inappropriate for all cases; rather, it suggests that it should not be put forward as a routine
or mandatory ADR process for handling malpractice disputes generally.
81. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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5. A Malpractice ADR System Should Be Designed to Reduce the Cost
of Litigation Significantly Through an Efficiently Administered System.
The overall transaction costs associated with malpractice litigation are
extraordinarily high. As a result, any ADR system must be designed to
reduce litigation expenses, at least for the majority of cases to which it will
be applied.
B. ADR Strategies for the Malpractice Context
1. Use of Voluntary ADR. One approach would be to rely primarily on
the voluntary efforts of litigants and malpractice insurers to use particular
ADR methods in appropriate cases. For the past four years, the Private
Adjudication Center, a non-profit affiliate of the Duke University School
of Law, has been providing ADR consulting services to malpractice
litigants on a case-by-case basis with some success.' The largest
malpractice insurer in North Carolina has commented favorably on this use
of ADR, noting that even the consideration of litigation alternatives has
assisted it in settling several cases.'
A major advantage of a voluntary approach is its ability to utilize any
of the different ADR methods discussed in part mH. Clearly, each of the
different procedures may be better suited to certain types of malpractice
disputes. Thus, realizing the full benefits of ADR requires a careful
matching of specific malpractice disputes with the particular ADR process
best suited to that case.84 Also, it may be that there are some malpractice
cases best suited to traditional litigation, and that any mandatory referral
to a particular ADR process will result in increased litigation expenses.
The importance of carefully matching ADR procedures with particular
disputes might work best under the case-by-case assessment inherent in a
voluntary approach. If a state were to enact some form of mandatory
ADR, policy-makers should be cognizant of the litigants' legitimate interest
in agreeing to alternative ADR methods in appropriate cases. Thus, any
82. As part of the duties as the Director of the Private Adjudication Center's Medical
Malpractice ADR program, this author regularly consults with malpractice insurers,
hospitals, plaintiffs attorneys, and defense attorneys about the use of various ADR methods
in specific malpractice cases. Since its inception in 1988, the program has used or observed
the use of several of the different ADR methods discussed in this comment, including
voluntary mediation, several forms of binding arbitrations, court-ordered mediation, court-
ordered arbitration and binding summary jury trials.
83. See MEDICAL MutruAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH CAROLINA, 1990 ANNuAL
REPORT 7 (1990) ('We have found that simply proposing alternative dispute resolution often
gets the discussion going again, which leads to settlements in cases that might otherwise go
to court.").
84. Cf. Maurice Rosenberg, Resolving Disputes Differently: Adieu to Adversary
Justice?, 21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 801, 809 (1988) ("[Tlhe ideal system will require
deploying a whole battery of dispute-resolving mechanisms, various directed, variously
driven and variously employed.).
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mandatory program should offer litigants the opportunity to select a
different ADR method.
Nonetheless, there are several drawbacks to avoluntary ADR approach.
The main problem is the fact that in a voluntary system, one party may
block the use of ADR regardless of how well suited the case. 5 Obtaining
an agreement to use ADR in even a simple malpractice case requires the
consent of five different parties: (1) the plaintiff- (2) plaintiffs' counsel;
(3) the defendant; (4) defense counsel; and (5) the malpractice insurer.
These actors may have divergent interests that impact their views on the
utility of ADR either in general or for their specific case. Reaching
agreement becomes even more difficult if the case involves multiple
defendants. Likewise, if different malpractice insurers are involved, a
voluntary consensus agreement on a particular ADR approach could be
nearly impossible to obtain.
Second, even if all the parties agree that ADR should be used,
substantial negotiations are often required as to what specific form should
be used. Spending time negotiating the alternative ground rules defeats one
of the principle benefits of ADR, that of efficiency. Third, certain ADR
options, such as court-ordered arbitration, depend upon the court
establishing the procedural rules to govern the process and administrate the
program. A court is less likely to establish a program without assurances
that it will be used.
2. Facilitating Private Arbitration. A second approach would be to
foster the development of private arbitration agreements between health
care providers and patients. A well designed and administered arbitration
process provides several advantages over traditional litigation. The primary
benefits include the quality of the decision-maker and the speed of
resolution (with its attendant potential reduction in litigation expenses).
These benefits accrue both to physicians and potential claimants who
currently are often unable to access the system because of its exceptionally
high administrative costs. An arbitration program with appropriate
selection criteria for arbitrators would be as likely to generate reliable and
consistent results.
The malpractice arbitration statutes enacted during the 1970's were
ostensibly designed to facilitate the use of arbitration, but in retrospect,
85. Existing empirical studies have regularly shown low levels of utilization for
voluntary ADR programs, which is probably attributable either to attorney or litigant
unfamiliarity with the processes involved, the economic motivation of attorneys to maintain
the status quo, or the adversarial nature of litigation. See Sally E. Merry & Susan S. Silbey,
What Do Plaintiffs Want? Reexamining the Concept ofDispute, 9 JUST. SYS. J. 151, 151-53
(1984); Dwight Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The
Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487, 488 (1989).
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their encouragement is minimal. By requiring extensive disclosure to
patients, by prohibiting physicians from conditioning the provision of
medical services on the signing of an agreement and by mandating
procedurally cumbersome arbitration rules, these statutes - especially in
light of strict judicial scrutiny of any agreements that were employed --
have virtually insured that few physicians would even attempt to enter into
arbitration contracts with their patients.
If binding arbitration is desirable (this author believes it is) there is a
need for a new generation of malpractice arbitration statutes that more
directly promote the use of arbitration. Such new statutes would: (1)
reduce the disclosures that a physician has to make to a patient; (2) permit
physicians to make acceptance of arbitration a condition for rendering
services; and (3) allow greater flexibility to the parties to design less
cumbersome arbitration procedures.
At first blush, such a statute would seem contrary to the patient's
interests, and as a result politically unfeasible. This view is myopic. The
key issue in terms of protecting patient interest is not pre-agreement
disclosures and warnings, but providing statutory safeguards to ensure the
quality and neutrality of the arbitration procedure itself. On this point, the
most important factors are the neutrality and qualifications of the
arbitrator.86 Assuming an arbitration process that is fair to both patient
and physician, there is no reason to restrict its use in malpractice simply
because it is the physician who takes the initiative in seeing that an
arbitration agreement is in place.
If a new statute were enacted, it remains unclear how many physicians
would take advantage of such a provision. Especially for individual
physicians, it is uncomfortable to discuss the prospects for a potential
malpractice claim with a patient. Moreover, plaintiffs' attorneys, at least
in some cases, would be likely to attempt to challenge arbitration
agreements on a case-by-case basis.
86. Some of the issues relating to the development of a fair and comprehensive
arbitration scheme have been addressed in recent federal legislative proposals. One of the
most innovative was a proposal by Senator Peter Domenici (R. New Mexico) that would
require the use of arbitration in most malpractice cases. Under the proposed legislation, all
medical malpractice cases would have been resolved through arbitration (or another ADR
process voluntarily agreed to by the parties) administered by one of several certifled ADR
providers. The bill set forth specific qualifications for what attributes a certified ADR
provider must possess. A summary of the proposed statute and a discussion of its
implications for ADR providers is provided in Clark C. Havighurst & Thomas B. Metzloff,
S. 1232 - A Late Entry in the Race for Malpractice Reform, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Spring 1991, at 179. A major difference between the mid-1970's and the current situation
is the growth in private ADR providers. Numerous entities have either entered or expanded
their operations in providing ADR services to disputants. Unquestionably, many of these
organizations would be interested in establishing a malpractice arbitration program if
sufficient demand existed.
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3. Development ofMediation-Based Programs. Another approach would
be to require malpractice litigants to submit their claims to mediation. In
this author's opinion, a mediation-based approach is inappropriate for the
majority of malpractice cases. A mediation approach makes sense,
however, if one assumes that malpractice litigants commonly have
litigation goals other than to obtain compensation for their injuries. Indeed,
in some percentage of malpractice cases, the plaintiff has filed the lawsuit
out of anger at the physician or hospital. In those cases, a mediation
session designed to explore the plaintiff's anger and aimed at eliciting
appropriate recognition of that emotion by the defendants could well be
productive. To be sure, there are malpractice cases that do involve this
dynamic; s7 on a limited case-by-case basis, mediation should be
considered as an ADR option.88
4. Applying the Court-Ordered Arbitration Model to Malpractice.
This author believes that the optimal ADR strategy would be to apply the
court-ordered arbitration model. As an initial matter, court-ordered
arbitration has the advantage of being well established in other litigation
contexts and constitutional.
89
The court-ordered arbitration model meets the established criteria in
every respect. First, among all ADR options, an arbitration process (be it
binding or non-binding) is least "settlement' oriented and more focused
upon making decisions on the merits of the case according to controlling
87. For example, the Private Adjudication Center has conducted a few mediations in
medical malpractice cases, one of which involved a classic dispute of the type described in
text.
88. In this author's experience, such cases represent the clear minority of malpractice
disputes. For the large majority of claims, the parties desire a decision on the merits of the
negligence claim.
A variation is the mandatory "mediated settlement conference" approach now used in
some states. At this point, it is too early in the development of this process to assess its
potential applicability to malpractice.
As currently formulated, there are several potential concerns. First, the mediators' role
as a practical matter is to create pressures on both parties to settle. As noted, malpractice
defendants have a legitimate interest in refusing to settle non-meritorious claims. Also, it
is clear that there is a significant amount of non-meritorious malpractice litigation. The
mediation approach, by seeking settlements in all cases, may not be well suited to the need
in malpractice cases to identify non-meritorious claims. Second, there is a serious question
as to the overall quality of the mediators serving in these programs. Since these programs
are applied to a wide variety of civil cases and not just malpractice disputes, few of the
mediators have experience in handling malpractice disputes. As such, the programs raise
serious concerns about the special interest in malpractice cases of employing skilled ADR
neutrals.
In other respects, a mediated settlement conference meets the established criteria in that
it is a simple procedure to administer, and it occurs early in the litigation process, thus
offering signicant cost savings if successful.
89. See generally Golann, supra note 85, at 565.
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legal principles, thus making it responsive to the first criterion. Arbitrators
in court-ordered arbitration programs are not expected to assist the parties
in reaching a compromise solution; rather, their function is to make an
informed decision based upon the parties' presentations. As such, the
process is also well suited among the ADR alternatives for identifying non-
meritorious cases, thus qualifying under the second criterion.
Third, a court-ordered arbitration program would employ only skilled
decision-makers. As noted, most programs currently use experienced
attorneys with expertise in a variety of litigation contexts because those
programs cover various types of litigation. If the program were focused on
malpractice disputes, special selection criteria could ensure the quality of
the arbitrators under the third criterion. Skilled arbitrators would
predictably be well suited to make consistent damage awards to the extent
possible under the current law of damages, as set forth in the fourth
criterion.
Finally, while other ADR options perhaps offer greater potential
savings because they operate earlier in the litigation process, court-ordered
arbitration occurs at an appropriate time in the development of the suit.
The arbitration is held only after the parties have had a reasonable
opportunity to conduct some discovery, thus avoiding an acknowledged
problem of pre-trial screening panels, such as in Alaska. By the same
token, the hearing should occur less than a year from the filing of the
claim, thus significantly reducing the current disposition time of most
malpractice disputes. Overall, this particular ADR intervention point
balances the interest in early intervention with the interest in having the
dispute sufficiently developed, so that a valid decision on the merits can be
made.
As noted above, a key factor in recognizing the benefits of court-
ordered arbitration is effective design and implementation of the program.
While theoretically well suited to the task, existing court-ordered arbitration
programs, which are currently targeted at a general array of smaller stakes
cases, may need to be restructured to maximize their potential utility for
malpractice. Possible changes include: (1) specialized methods for
selecting arbitrators to serve in the program; (2) development of
appropriate discovery rules; and (3) design of an arbitration format suited
to the malpractice context
VI. MALPRACTICE ADR AND ALASKA
Alaska has two statutory provisions impacting the use of ADR in
malpractice cases. First, it has an elaborate -- and controversial -- expert
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screening panel procedure.90 In light of the descriptions provided in part
m, the Alaska panel system is a hybrid. Although commonly referred to
as a screening panel, the Alaska process differs from the panels enacted
elsewhere in that it operates not as a pre-trial review system, but rather
only with respect to claims in which lawsuits have already been filed.
Moreover, the panel is composed exclusively of medical professionals,
unlike the usual mix of physician, lawyer, and lay members utilized in
other states. Finally, the panel's task is not to decide the case, but rather
to offer a neutral expert opinion. In fact, in terms of the ADR categories
shown in Illustration 2, the process is probably more akin to an early
neutral evaluation process focused solely on the issues of the
appropriateness of the medical care rendered. In short, the panel system
is best characterized as requiring the court appointment of neutral experts.
Alaska also has in place an arbitration statute ostensibly designed to
facilitate the use of private arbitration.9 ' In fact, however, none of those
familiar with malpractice litigation are aware of any claim resolved
pursuant to an arbitration agreement under the auspices of this statute.
Accordingly, for whatever reason, the malpractice arbitration statute has
had no impact on the resolution of malpractice claims in Alaska.
As discussed above, an appropriate ADR strategy is to attempt to
reinvigorate the use of private arbitration agreements. In Alaska, at a
minimum, this would require removing or scaling back some of the
disclosure requirements which interfere with physicians and patients
entering into a binding arbitration contract, substituting in their place
measures to insure the quality of the arbitration process. As noted, this
effort is unlikely in the short-term to radically transform malpractice
litigation. Many physicians will continue to elect not to offer the
arbitration option to patients. Moreover, unless the Alaska Legislature is
willing to permit physicians to require patients to sign such agreements as
a condition of receipt of services (which is probably politically unlikely, in
light of the serious concerns with access to health care in Alaska), a
considerable number of patients will continue to refuse to sign arbitration
agreements. Thus, while a revised, more pro-arbitration, statute is needed
in order to recognize the benefits that this process offers both patients and
physicians, this change by itself is likely to have only marginal short-term
impact.
Fundamentally reconstructing the expert panel system will have a
significantly greater influence. It is clear that there are several practical
problems associated with the administration of the expert panels. It is
90. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.536 (Supp. 1992). A detailed description of the expert panel
system is contained in Aronie, supra note 56.
91. ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1992).
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becoming increasingly difficult to form the three-member panels. 2
Alaska has a small physician pool, and many have potentially disqualifying
conflicts that prevent them from serving on panels involving their business
partners or close friends. As currently operated, the panels, either owing
to the difficulty of formation or the scheduling of meetings, are delaying
the resolution of claims. Also, inconsistent quality of the panel reports is
casting a cloud over the reliability of the process.
As noted above, the best suited ADR option for Alaska is the court-
ordered arbitration model. Requiring malpractice cases to be submitted to
a mandatory but non-binding process offers significant promise for
achieving the goals set forth above.
The court-ordered arbitration model proposed for Alaska is based upon
the federal court program described in part mI.E. The essential elements
of the proposal include: (1) providing an appropriate period for the parties
to conduct discovery, (2) developing a qualified list of attorney arbitrators
skilled in tort litigation;9 (3) allowing for party choice in selecting the
arbitrator for the non-binding arbitration from among the group of qualified
arbitrators; (4) requiring pre-hearing exchange of information; (5)
conducting a hearing of sufficient length to permit fair exchange of the
issues in the case;95 (6) preparing a reasoned decision to assist the parties
in resolving the case; and (7) providing either party the opportunity to seek
trial de novo, perhaps allowing the arbitrator's decision to be admissible at
the subsequent trialY
6
92. See Aronie, supra note 56, at 419.
93. Id. at 418.
94. The list need not be long. It would appear from various insurance and litigation
sources that there are about 40 medical malpractice cases filed per year in Alaska.
Experience from other court-ordered arbitration programs has shown that a fair number of
settlements or dismissals occur prior to the scheduling of the arbitration hearing. Thus, on
average, it may be necessary to conduct 30 arbitration hearings a year. A small but highly
qualified group of five to ten arbitrators would be sufficient to handle this caseload. Using
a smaller, carefully selected group of arbitrators rather than a larger list makes it easier to
train the group in how to conduct the sessions and permits the court to be more selective
in terms of desired qualifications.
95. Based upon this author's experience in administering arbitrations in malpractice
cases, there is no one time period that is perfectly suited to a malpractice dispute. The
Private Adjudication Center has conducted arbitrations as short as two hours where the issue
involved simply determining a plaintiff's damages in a case in which the physician-
defendant had accepted responsibility for the injury. On the other extreme was a two and
a half day arbitration involving a complex causation and damage issue following a drug
overdose. The court-ordered arbitration rules should provide for the arbitrator to establish
the length following a presentation by the parties on the nature of the issues involved in the
case. In general, one day would be sufficient for the majority of malpractice cases. The
rules should also provide a maximum of two or three days. It should also be possible in
some cases for the hearing to last a half day or less.
96. Ordinarily, arbitrations do not result in a formal explanation of the arbitrator's
decision; rather, an award is simply announced. This orientation, however, is not required.
It makes more sense in this context to ask the arbitrator to explain briefly his or her
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The opportunity also exists in Alaska to incorporate a modified version
of the current expert panel system into the proposed court-ordered
arbitration program. The power to use court-appointed experts is well
established.' In connection with the proposed arbitration procedure, the
court could also appoint a neutral medical expert who would testify during
the non-binding arbitration hearing, thus serving the same function as that
served by the current panel. In order to overcome the administrative delays
associated with the current panel procedure, the number of experts involved
should be reduced from three to one.9"
VII. CONCLUSION
Procedural reform by itself is unlikely to solve the perceived problems
with our malpractice litigation system. Nonetheless, the increased use of
ADR offers much promise. This comment has set forth a structure for
considering available ADR options as well as a reasoned set of criteria for
distinguishing among them. Based upon those factors and taking into
account the current Alaskan procedures, development of a court-ordered
arbitration program for malpractice disputes offers to make the malpractice
litigation system fairer to all parties, more consistent, and less costly.
reasoning in reaching the decision that was made. Cf. WEILER, supra note 1, at 115-16(describing AMA plan to require hearing officers to explain their decisions). Providing a
written explanation would assist the parties in settling. Such a decision could also be made
admissible at the subsequent trial should any party request a trial de novo.
97. See FED. R. EVID. 706. For an analysis of one state's use of court-appointed
experts in appellate cases, see Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Fundamental Approach for
Managing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CI. L. REV. 440, 468-78 (1986).
98. Other changes in the current system would also be advisable. First, the current
provision could be simplified so that the parties were responsible for providing the neutral
expert with information rather than forcing the physician to independently investigate the
matter. Second, the series of questions which the panel now is required to answer could be
simplified. This author proposes that the neutral expert be asked to report on the liability
and causation issues, in addition to any specific questions posed by the arbitrator. In most
cases, the expert would be expected to testify at the hearing (either in person or by
telephone).
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